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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Incentive competition is on the rise. It is costly, generally ineffi cient, 
and often ineffective even for the winning regions. Yet some regions do 
very well by attracting large, new facilities that create sustained jobs, 
bolster the tax base, and have multiplier effects. The nation states of Eu-
rope have developed an effective regulatory system that curtails abuse, 
but the United States, Canada, and Australia have grappled with forms 
of cooperation and regulation less successfully. Incentive competition 
is spreading to developing countries, especially as responsibility for 
and fi scal capacity to support economic development have devolved 
to subnational levels of government. Local governments also compete 
for mobile capital, export-oriented as well as retail. Incentive competi-
tion for capital is an increasingly important public policy issue, because 
it consumes considerable resources, alters the spatial distribution of 
economic activity, and entails large opportunity costs for citizens and 
businesses. 
In this chapter, we argue that incentive competition cannot be ad-
equately approached in a game theoretic, microeconomic fashion. The 
phenomenon deserves a historical explanation that probes national and 
global institutional and political changes shaping the rise and character 
of bidding wars. Our treatment is thus interdisciplinary, incorporating 
insights from economics, economic history, geography and regional 
science, political science, political sociology, and urban and regional 
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planning. This chapter is both an original interpretation of the origins 
and analytics of the “regional market for jobs and tax capacity” and an 
introduction to and framing of the contributions in the volume. 
We fi rst show that incentive competition is proliferating, not just in 
the United States and other OECD countries, but also in large, devel-
oping countries with federal power sharing, such as Brazil, India, and 
China. Many more state and local governments have been thrust into 
such competition worldwide, and the total amount spent on incentive 
competition has been rising rapidly. Incentive competition is also wax-
ing among nations, and we explore briefl y how the policy and institu-
tional environment differs in these cases. 
In an effort to analyze the source of this trend, we offer an institu-
tional and political interpretation of the rise of incentive competition. 
To economic and geographic causes such as falling transportation and 
communication costs, vertical disintegration of fi rms, and a greater spa-
tial division of labor within fi rms, we stress three additional develop-
ments: the rise of site consultants who broker deals between fi rms and 
governments; the spread of devolution across the globe, with its delega-
tion of responsibility for economic development to subnational govern-
ments; and the signifi cance of politics and political calculus on the part 
of participating governments. 
We then contrast three different approaches to incentive competi-
tion, each with its own economic logic and cast of characters. First, we 
review the relatively benign view that incentive competition is a healthy 
way for communities to compete for mobile fi rms with optimal pack-
ages of public services at tax prices and that the outcome is effi cient. 
We review the prisoner’s dilemma approach, which views incentive 
competition in game-analytic terms and concludes that it has at best a 
zero sum and at worst a negative effi ciency outcome. We offer our own 
model, what we call the “market for jobs and fi scal capacity” approach, 
in which information asymmetries not only disadvantage government 
competitors for jobs but are created and maintained as rent-producing 
devices through the intermediation of the site consulting industry. For 
each of the three competing theories, we identify the conceptualiza-
tion of the market in which incentives are negotiated, the actors and 
their assumed behavior, market outcomes, normative underpinnings, 
and strengths and weaknesses from both analytical and policy points 
of view. 
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Our model, with its explicit institutional and political dimensions, 
favors the retention of local government’s ability to allocate resources to 
and regulate economic development activity but advocates reforms that 
will improve the performance of the market for jobs. This position, in 
contrast to the “leave it alone, it is good” or the “tax or regulate it away” 
recommendations of the other approaches, is compatible with most of 
the fi ndings and recommendations of other authors in this volume. 
We then ask what is known about the outcomes of incentive com-
petition, referring to various contributions in this volume and others’ 
work. We fi nd it quite mixed. In some cases, incentives can and do cre-
ate jobs and enhance the tax base in ways that are effi cient, equitable, 
and environmentally benign. But microeconomic theoretic approaches 
limit the assessment of outcomes too narrowly, and the political drama 
of incentive competition tends to crowd out other economic develop-
ment paths. We challenge the implicit premise that external investments 
of plants or facilities are the only route to regional economic develop-
ment, reviewing the evolution of export base theory. Endogenous en-
trepreneurial activity, investments in human capital and amenities, and 
even reshaping local consumption patterns can yield signifi cant long-
term job growth. Bidding wars divert decision-makers’ attention from a 
broader portfolio of economic development tools and options. Incentive 
packages thus incur large opportunity costs. We argue for a unifi ed eco-
nomic development budget as a policy innovation for evaluating and 
improving incentive offers. We support many of the reforms spelled out 
by the other authors in this volume. 
IS THE GEOGRAPHIC COMPETITION FOR 
CAPITAL INCREASING?
Many writers and economy watchers contend that the spatial com-
petition for capital is increasing and more intense than ever. In this vol-
ume, both Kenneth Thomas and Timothy Bartik make this statement, 
echoing notable book-length treatments by Bluestone and Harrison 
(1982); Noponen, Graham, and Markusen (1993); and more recently 
Friedman (2006). Little hard evidence is offered for this view beyond 
the surge in transnational capital fl ows and internationally traded com-
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modities, concentrated deindustrialization, and an appeal to our com-
mon experience. Thomas’s argument is that greater fl uidity of capital 
across regional and national borders increases the number of sites that 
are possible for any particular investment and thus makes the problem 
less manageable for competing governments.
Yet worldwide, regional and local communities with responsibil-
ity for their own economic development perceive that the competition 
for mobile capital, linked to the expectation of extraregional exports, 
is increasing. Many communities are directly affected when compa-
nies show an interest in sites and ask what can be done to help them; 
those that have not been so lucky are interested in becoming candi-
dates. Does a review of national and subnational government behavior 
around the world suggest that competition for mobile physical capital 
has increased? Have governments increased their involvement in bid-
ding wars, and has the size of packages offered increased? Our answer 
is a cautious “yes.”
In the United States, the evidence is fairly strong that incentive 
competition has increased since the 1960s. “Bidding wars” for specifi c 
plants or facilities have become widespread, with incentive packages 
escalating in total worth. In addition, fi rms already operating in juris-
dictions are now asking for comparable concessions just to remain open 
and retain jobs. LeRoy (2005) has done a masterful job of documenting 
hundreds of individual cases of successful and failed incentive competi-
tions in the United States over the past 20 years.
Hard evidence of an increase in numbers of governments involved 
and size of incentives is harder to come by, because of the complex-
ity of modeling and testing for change over time. However, two recent 
studies suggest that incentive competition in the United States has in-
creased over the past few decades. Using state-level data on manufac-
turing income, capital and labor and their tax-adjusted prices, Chirinko 
and Wilson (2006) show that investment tax incentives have become in-
creasingly common and increasingly large over the period 1963–2004. 
Peter Fisher, in Chapter 3, cites data showing that in the 1990s, the aver-
age incentive package available to new business investment in 20 U.S. 
states increased from 10 percent to 30 percent of gross business taxes.
The competition for mobile capital in the United States is not solely 
a late twentieth century phenomenon. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, communities across the United States competed for agri-
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cultural capital, railroad lines, grain mills, meatpacking plants, and 
steel mills, as well as farmers and workers (Sbragia 1996). Fascinat-
ing histories have been written about the competition for mobile fa-
cilities, public and private, in certain sectors and in entire regions. For 
example, Lotchin (1984) reveals how California cities competed for 
large military bases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and Markusen et al. (1991) show how Colorado Springs out-competed 
other U.S. cities for the army air bases, the Air Force Academy, and 
the Space Command from the 1930s to the 1980s. Cobb (1993) reveals 
how southern states crusaded for industrial development by attempting 
to lure branch plants in the period from 1936 to 1990. But the character 
of this competition has changed. In the following section, we address 
the postwar emergence of an organized U.S. “market” for mobile plants 
and the jobs and tax base that they bring, the product of institutional in-
novations that are now spreading to other continents.
Other countries with federal systems have long experienced similar 
subnational competition for large capital investments, but the stakes 
have ballooned in recent decades. Australia has a long history of com-
petition for capital among states, led by its major East Coast cities (Ber-
ry 1984). Lagging regions such as South Australia used subsidies to lure 
major East Coast suppliers—in the auto industry, for instance—in the 
post-World War II era (Wanna 1980). In 2003, following Rupert Mur-
doch’s News Corporation’s extraction of A$100 million in concessions 
to build the $430 million Fox Studios development in Sydney, all but 
one of Australia’s state governments, Queensland, signed an agreement 
to end investment bidding wars, pledging to exchange information on 
projects where companies attempt to play one state against the other 
(State of Victoria 2003). Queensland, the fastest-growing region, re-
fused to participate because at the time it was successfully bidding cor-
porate headquarters and facilities away from Victoria and New South 
Wales with undisclosed deals. In 2006, fi ve states signed a fi ve-year 
renewal, agreeing to cooperate against multinational efforts to pit them 
against each other, to provide each other with an annual report on at-
traction activities, and to construct a mechanism where concerns about 
breaches can be raised. Queensland again refused to join, and thus the 
agreement does not include efforts by states to use tax cuts or other in-
centives to lure business from interstate rivals (Hughes 2006). 
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Regional competition for capital may be waxing in Europe as well. 
The European states, as Adinda Sinnaeve describes in Chapter 4, made 
a historic decision to rein in the competition for capital among member 
states and locations within them. In the 1957 Treaty of Rome that formed 
the European Union, they agree to ban most subsidies to business for 
plant locations except under certain circumstances. Underdeveloped re-
gions are permitted to attract businesses with incentives, and certain 
types of inducements—for job training and R&D, for instance—are 
permitted. The regulatory system is highly effective, especially at de-
terring incentives from being offered. Modest reforms are contemplated 
(Wishlade 2004), but by and large, the regime is robust.
Nevertheless, as European countries devolve economic develop-
ment responsibility to lower levels of government, a response to the 
demand for autonomy on the part of regions (e.g., Spain) and central 
government fi scal fatigue, the phenomenon of incentive competition 
may reemerge. The European Union regulatory scheme does not extend 
to local governments’ use of their own resources or taxing powers to at-
tract new plants or facilities, unless national governments compensate 
them for such incentives, and court cases are now pressing regions’ 
rights in this regard (Nicolaides 2005, 2006). Yet to date, such subna-
tional discretionary powers are quite limited, and the conditions set by 
the courts on their use are quite restrictive. 
Since the early 1990s, the American-style regional competition for 
capital is proliferating in developing countries, especially within large 
countries with federal systems of governance such as Brazil and India, 
and in China. Nowhere has it been fi ercer than among Brazilian states 
in their competition for 22 new assembly plants planned and built by 
foreign auto companies since 1995. Despite Brazilian laws forbidding 
the reduction of state taxes to attract business, fi scal competition has 
been rampant and has resulted in excessively large incentives packages 
that radically relocated the industry away from Sao Paulo to four neigh-
boring states (Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix 2001; Varsano, Ferriera, and 
Afonso 2002). The cost per job created appears to be much higher (on 
the order of $54,000 to $340,000 per job) than in the United States 
(Oman 2000), and incentives have induced 40 percent more auto-
making capacity in Brazil than would otherwise have been built (Far-
rell, Remes, and Schulz 2003). India, where economic development 
responsibilities and fi scal tools have been devolving to the states, is 
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hosting greater fi scal competition and larger tax incentives packages 
(Venkatesan 2000; Schneider 2004).
In China, recent fi scal reforms give cities and regions greater re-
sponsibility for local economic development. Cities can now launch 
large development projects and retain the resulting income (rents, tax-
es), and they can customize their investment to the specifi cations of 
individual foreign investors. Although they cannot engage in bonding, 
they can form partnerships with banks and foreign investors, and have 
done so to fi nance huge infrastructure projects. Concomitantly, a fi erce 
battle for competitive status has broken out, with cities ranked nation-
ally on their success in attracting capital. Xu and Yeh (2005) describe 
the proliferation of this competition and its dangers, in that Chinese cit-
ies (and banks) face only soft budget constraints; if returns do not mate-
rialize, the nation state is required to bail them out. This creates condi-
tions, they argue, for excessive and ineffi cient investments. In reality, 
enormous differences in natural resources, accessibility and physical 
infrastructure dominate the locational calculus of mobile fi rms in China 
(Yeung 2003).
Incentive competition occurs between nations as well as within 
them. Smaller countries increasingly believe that they must compete 
for mobile capital with each other. They have been protagonists in high-
profi le bidding wars, as in the famous shopping expedition of John 
DeLorean to Puerto Rico, Ireland, and Northern Ireland to site his auto 
plant. The winning total incentive package can add up to as much as 75 
percent of the total investment cost of a project (Guisinger 1995). In 
the 1990s, newly independent and democratic Eastern European coun-
tries competed for European, Japanese, and American plants, often with 
little assurance that such incentives deals might be effective (Helinska-
Hughes and Hughes 2003). Following the fall of the Berlin wall, East-
ern European countries such as Poland and Bulgaria offered special lo-
cation incentive packages with very mixed results. Critics argue that 
these countries would have been better off investing in the overall busi-
ness environment and infrastructure and that their use has eroded the 
tax base without signifi cantly attracting investment (Sorsa 2003). As 
these countries join the EU, they must bring their practices in line with 
the EU’s regulatory framework.
A small but important literature documents and addresses grow-
ing incentive competition among Canada, the United States, and Mex-
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ico both before and after the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) (DeMont 1994; Jenkins 1987; Leyton-Brown 1979–1980). 
An increase in the size of subsidies to the auto industry in the United 
States and Canada is documented by Thomas (1997), who attributes it 
to fi ercer competition for auto plants. Several policy researchers have 
made the case for a European-type commission in NAFTA to regulate 
incentive competition among the three countries (Graham and Warner 
1994; Pastor 2001).
Although we do not address incentive competition between nations 
in this volume, some policy initiatives at multilateral and bilateral lev-
els have begun to address it. East Asia is a focal point for strategy and 
experimentation. A study of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam found 
that incentives are expensive and not very effective (Fletcher 2002). 
Another policy analyst concluded that competition among countries in 
Southeast Asia for inward investment may be unavoidable, but that na-
tional incentive offers should be streamlined and designed to limit the 
drain on budgets and the potential for corruption (Tseng 2002). Anoth-
er considers the Asian-Pacifi c region ripe for an investment code that 
would put limits on incentive levels, simplify incentive instruments, 
create greater transparency, and evaluate the results of incentives (Guis-
inger 1995). 
Investment competition between nation-states is distinguished from 
the subnational focus of our study in that the former is governed by in-
ternational organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Each of 
these organizations has an interest in reining in the use of subnational 
tax incentives and subsidies to minimize trade distortions. The WTO 
has opposed export or local content performance requirements in return 
for incentives and allows other countries to apply countervailing du-
ties against export subsidies, while the IMF and World Bank encourage 
borrowers to reduce subsidies (Guisinger 1995). In a carefully reasoned 
paper, Schweke and Stumberg (1999) anticipate that subnational eco-
nomic development could become illegal in the new global policy envi-
ronment. However, a recent WTO World Trade Annual Report focused 
on the issue of subsidies acknowledges that some subsidies can benefi t 
society and offset the negative externalities of economic activity and 
that both national and subnational governments have legitimate objec-
tives in using them, including for economic development. The WTO 
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remains concerned that such subsidies may be trade-distorting. The 
report notes that few governments fully meet their notifi cation obliga-
tions under the WTO, contributing to a serious lack of information and 
transparency on the use and effect of subsidies, a situation aggravated 
by lack of common defi nitions of subsidy practices (WTO 2006).
There undoubtedly will be future tussles over WTO policies toward 
subsidies at all levels of government. If EU-type reasoning is followed, 
a case might be made for allowing developing but not developed na-
tions to use incentives, analogous to the permissiveness the EU rules 
show to underdeveloped regions in Europe. Currently, the WTO esti-
mates that 21 developed countries spend almost $250 billion on sub-
sidies of all types, almost 85 percent of all countries’ subsidies. The 
average ratio of subsidies to GDP is lower in developing countries than 
developed, though there are large variations within each country group 
(WTO 2006, pp. 112–114). Developed countries, which have the larg-
est stake in preserving subsidies, appear to have successfully argued 
within the WTO that many subsidies are not primarily trade-motivated 
but are designed to build infrastructure, foster new industries, promote 
research and develop new knowledge, protect the environment, redis-
tribute income, and help poor consumers (WTO 2006, p. xxii). 
To summarize, then, incentive competition is on the rise, as demon-
strated in the energies devoted to it by subnational governments and the 
size of incentive packages. It is most common in nations with federal 
structures that share taxing and economic development powers with 
state and local governments. Although analogous competition occurs 
among nation states, it is better regulated and subject to international 
organizational scrutiny. Technological change has obliterated many for-
mer barriers to interglobal location, enabling such competition. But in-
centive competition is also very much shaped by important institutional 
and political changes, to which we now turn. 
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL SOURCES OF 
INCENTIVE COMPETITION
In regional bidding wars, the principal actors are state or local gov-
ernments and private sector employers. Incentive packages are put to-
up07amritcCh.1.indd   9 4/11/2008   10:30:44 AM
10   Markusen and Nesse
gether by the governmental unit, in response to an expression of inter-
est, and sometimes demands, by the potential employer, who may state 
that he/she also has other potential sites in mind. Each set of actors 
operates in a historically evolved institutional context that conditions 
their options and responses (Markusen 2003). In this section, we argue 
that two important institutional changes have altered this environment: 
the rise of site consultants as a third party in the process, and increas-
ing devolution of economic development responsibilities from central 
to subnational governments. In addition, the motivations of regional 
political leaders exacerbate the intensity of bidding wars, with negative 
social and economic results.
American regional scientists and public fi nance economists were 
long puzzled by a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon: despite dozens 
of surveys of the determinants of fi rm plant location that placed geo-
graphical tax differentials very far down on the list of factors that mat-
ter, state and local governments continue to feel that they must offer 
incentives and lower tax burdens. Firms surveyed from the 1950s well 
into the 1980s dismissed the importance of taxes as an interregional 
siting factor—instead, transportation costs, raw material access, labor 
costs, land costs, infrastructure, and access to markets dominated their 
locational calculus. But in the past decade or so, fi rms are now more 
likely to claim that taxes matter, and empirical estimates suggest that 
they do matter in terms of differential job creation (Bartik 2007; Wasyl-
enko 1997). Why this shift?
Falling transportation and communications costs are one contribu-
tor, as noted by Bartik in Chapter 5. These ease the friction of distance 
and make other determinants—land costs, labor costs, and infrastructure 
more important. Yet these costs have been falling for at least two cen-
turies as sequential transportation breakthroughs (steam ship, railroad, 
trucking, containerization) and communications breakthroughs (tele-
graph, telephone, radio, and radar) without triggering much incentive 
competition until recently. Corporate vertical disintegration and greater 
geographical separation of sequential stages in the production process 
also have contributed, creating a spatial division of labor in which rou-
tine manufacturing or fi nal assembly can be located in far-fl ung sites for 
either cost or market access reasons, while management, research and 
development, advance manufacturing, and other functions are placed 
elsewhere (Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1979; Markusen 1985). 
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Our view is that these explanations contribute to but are inadequate 
for fully accounting for the spread of subsidy competition and the size 
of recent incentive packages. Two recent institutional forces are central 
to this process. First, an entrepreneurial innovation in the site selection 
process has altered the institutional environment: the rise of the site 
location consultant. Even though fi rms did not consider tax differentials 
important, they were in a position to extract concessions or “rents” from 
regions in the negotiating process. Research on defense industry loca-
tion over the decades demonstrates that company leaders were often 
completely oblivious to the potential profi t they could make by relocat-
ing their facilities elsewhere and selling existing sites, often adjacent to 
major airports, for tremendous returns—engineers dominated manage-
ment circles, and to them, real estate was just an unimportant happen-
stance (Markusen et al. 1991). We hypothesize that this attitude toward 
local government and its tax/service offerings prevailed for U.S. fi rms 
until the emergence of site consultants. 
The rise of site consultants as brokers in the location process is a 
fascinating story. The Fantus Corporation pioneered this line of work 
in the 1930s and dominated the fi eld until the late 1970s, by which 
time they had relocated 4,000 plants, mostly to low wage, antiunion, 
low business tax and nonurban sites in the south. Fantus, named after 
its industrial real estate founder, specialized in comparative analysis 
of potential sites for companies looking to locate new branch plants or 
offi ces, When son-in-law Leonard Yaseen took over the business, he 
began to charge for the analysis. In the 1950s, when fears of strategic 
bombing were strong, the U.S. government began promoting the dis-
persal of military manufacturing plants, amplifying the market for site 
relocation services. In the same era, Fantus began to help large corpora-
tions investigate overseas locations. Yaseen then suggested that compa-
nies play one location against the other, demonstrating that the tax and 
subsidy savings generated could cover his fee. Working the trade media 
and corporate networking channels, Fantus became a major opinion-
maker in the market for sites. For instance, Yaseen dismissed New York 
City as a place to do business, a function of personal animosity despite 
his location there. In 1975, Fantus authored the fi rst state “business cli-
mate” rankings, setting off state bidding wars. Eventually, Fantus was 
sold to the accounting fi rm Deloitte & Touche, and other fi rms entered 
the site selection business (Cobb 1993; LeRoy 2005). 
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Over time the industry has become more fragmented, split between 
independent consulting fi rms, large international accounting fi rms, and 
law fi rms, but is still quite oligopolistic in character, especially in the 
large plant location business. Its success has been linked to other de-
velopments in corporate governance: the rise of institutional investors 
and their pressuring of management for higher short-term returns, the 
ascendancy of professional managers, and the growth of real estate as a 
corporate asset class.1 
This site brokering business has become institutionalized in ways 
that enhanced the rate of return for site consultants and their clients. The 
emergence of a brokering function diminishes competition among sup-
pliers of jobs and tax base by standardizing the way large corporations 
approach subnational governments (Thomas 2000, p. 31). Site con-
sultants began to hold specialist conferences and create organizations 
like the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (Raines 
2003). Trade magazines such as Corporate Location and Site Selection, 
supported by advertising dollars from site location fi rms, encouraged 
negotiating fi rms to choose several states/cities to approach and play 
off against each other, even if they already had decided on an optimal 
location. They list deal winners and losers in every issue. 
Site consultants began working for the other side, too, marketing 
their services to cities and regions on the grounds that they have knowl-
edge about fi rm priorities that government offi cials do not have. When 
hired, consultants gain access to knowledge of cities and states’ fi scal 
circumstances and economic development strategies that they can then 
use in service of their corporate clients (LeRoy 2005). However, site 
consultants’ loyalties almost always lie with the interests of the job-
selling corporation, especially, as is common, when they earn their fees 
on a commission basis. The higher the tax break and subsidy package 
extracted, the higher their fees. In real estate sales, where this lopsided 
relationship is also pervasive, many states have banned such dual agen-
cy. In Chapter 8, Greg LeRoy argues that site location consultants have 
come “to occupy a space where they defy norms about professional eth-
ics and the proper representation of opposing parties,” noting that com-
missions can run up to 30 percent of the value of acquired subsidies. 
Our argument, then, is that a concerted institution-building process 
has introduced a new set of players, site consultants, into the spatial 
competition for jobs. As we argue in the next section, their success can 
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be attributed to economic rents that can be extracted from job-hungry 
governments, especially when information asymmetries can be exploit-
ed and even created. 
A second institutional change contributes signifi cantly to the feroc-
ity of subsidy competition among subnational governments. Over the 
past 20 years, national governments have engaged in a process of devo-
lution, abandoning the practice of regional policies aimed at balancing 
uneven development and relegating responsibility for economic devel-
opment to subnational governments. More and more countries, large 
and small, are creating federal systems of shared powers, following the 
apparently successful models of the United States and Germany, where 
multipolar urban systems (Markusen and Gwiasda 1993) ameliorate pri-
vate city-centric rural to urban migration and create competition among 
subnational governments. In the United States, the federal system has 
long dampened enthusiasm for the type of national regional policies 
practiced in Europe—the territorially based Congress (in contrast to a 
party-based Parliament) acts as an informal resource distribution sys-
tem instead (Markusen 1994).
Devolution has complex sources of political support. Many state 
and local governors and politicians welcome greater control over pub-
lic and private investments decisions, especially if their regions have 
suffered from neglect from a former political regime, as in such di-
verse settings as Cataluña, Wales, Chile, Nicaragua, and South Korea. 
In some cases, devolution is tied to powerful political movements for 
greater autonomy, including the assertion of cultural identity. Econo-
mists preoccupied with effi ciency in location government spending and 
taxation, à la Tiebout (1956b), argue that public services can be better 
tailored to regional and local preferences under decentralized structures. 
Devolution has been favored and strongly incentivized by international 
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank as a means of fi scal 
discipline for national governments in developing countries where re-
gional policy often provided fertile ground for corruption and wasteful 
spending. National leaders often see devolution as offering relief from 
expensive (and sometimes ineffi cient) regional programs and a budget-
saving windfall. Concern for uneven development, for the cumulative 
causation process so elegantly analyzed by Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor 
(1970), and for the distributional consequences of mobile investment, 
including the ineffi cient underutilization of local infrastructure in de-
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clining regions (Markusen 1979), is much less often articulated in na-
tional economic policymaking in the early twenty-fi rst century. 
However, devolution is neither a simple nor universally successful 
way of deploying public responsibility for economic development. In 
the United States, the implicit role model, state governments have had 
powerful tools for raising revenues and engaging in public infrastruc-
ture provision since the Constitution was drafted in 1787. In general, 
they have in turn delegated revenue-raising and bonding powers to lo-
cal governments. As a result, subnational governments have consider-
able but uneven resources to bring to bear on economic development. In 
many contemporary instances of devolution, central governments give 
their states and localities economic development responsibility but do 
not complement them with adequate resources or revenue-raising pow-
ers (Llanes 1998). Furthermore, most subnational governments have 
little expertise or experience with economic development, exposing 
them to greater information asymmetries in bargaining with multina-
tional corporations and their site consultants. As a result, devolution 
may quicken incentive competition among states and localities while 
exacerbating disparities in economic outcomes, as shown by Markusen 
and Diniz (2005) for Latin America, and Schneider (2004) for India, 
where the wealthiest states usually win such competition. 
Politics are also important. Scholars have long contended that eco-
nomic development practice cannot be understood without an apprecia-
tion for political structure and interest group politics. Molotch (1976) 
made the seminal and durable case that localities develop “growth ma-
chines” comprised of groups who own local assets or make their living 
selling or maintaining them and who do not have options for expand-
ing or relocating elsewhere. In general, Molotch argued, these groups 
will develop inordinate infl uence in local politics and push for policies 
that induce aggregate population growth. In a survey of European cit-
ies, Gordon and Jayet (1991) document the rise of recognizable urban 
growth machines in Europe, and Cheshire and Gordon (1996) offer a 
pessimistic view of the ability of territorial agreements to rein in such 
competition. More recently, Lovering (2003) offers a theory of the re-
gional service class as a group with high stakes in the attraction of out-
side capital. These political economy theories predict that subnational 
governments will overinvest in incentives that help owners of local-
specifi c assets at a net cost to local residents.2
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A number of policy analysts have offered behavioral explanations 
for why state and local politicians will espouse and energetically pur-
sue large incentive packages even when they are risky, unnecessary, 
damaging to the fi scal future of the locality, displacing, or place ex-
traordinary burdens on constituents to fund future services. For one, 
politicians are motivated by the desire to be reelected, which relies on 
name recognition and on contributions from individuals and businesses. 
These often lead to high-profi le, large commitments to and ribbon-cut-
ting ceremonies for new plants and facilities, often in the richest, fast-
est-growing areas, even when economic development programs passed 
by legislatures contain explicit language that favors smaller fi rms and 
poorer regions (Dewar 1998; Luger and Bae 2005; Wolman and Spitz-
ley 1996). For another, local offi cials may want to be seen as proactive 
in economic development matters and fear that nay-saying will provide 
fodder for opponents in future elections or saddle the region with a bad 
reputation among the site consultants who they see as gatekeepers to 
job-creating investment (Reid and Gatrell 2003; Wolman 1988). Brazil-
ian state governments are subject to similar political distortions, affect-
ing incentive competition and leading to bankruptcy (Rodriques-Pose 
and Arbix 2001).
These institutional features caution against treating the spatial mar-
ket for jobs as a conventional market. On neither side of this market 
are the participants operating from simple microeconomic demand and 
supply positions. Politicans, as demanders of jobs, are motivated by 
features of the political process as well as the collective welfare of their 
constituents. Companies, as suppliers of jobs, rely on site consultants 
to massage the market in their interests; they act as surrogates for fi rm 
managers. In the following section, we review the various models that 
others have used to conceptualize subsidy competition and offer a third, 
institutionally grounded view. 
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO INCENTIVE COMPETITION
Schematically, analyses of and policy implications toward spatial 
incentive competition can be divided into three camps. One argues that 
incentive competition is an effi cient way of allocating public resources 
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to economic development because it sets up a competition among units 
of government for mobile capital. This approach approves of the sta-
tus quo and is opposed to any attempt to regulate or eliminate such 
competition. A second camp argues that incentive competition is inef-
fi cient because it distorts the location of productive capacity from what 
it would have been in the absence of subsidies, and recommends that it 
be outlawed or taxed away at higher levels of government. A third camp 
argues that subnational governments should and do have responsibility 
for economic development but that contemporary excesses are associ-
ated with asymmetries in the market for jobs that should be regulated. 
Next, we lay out the logic of each of these positions, comparing how 
each conceptualizes the market for subsidies, how policy posture fol-
lows from these, and which economic and political agents are aligned 
with each.
Tiebout-Type Models of Spatial Competition for Firms
The “let it be” camp conceives (often implicitly) of the siting pro-
cess and subsidy bargaining between units of government and fi rms as 
taking place in a spatially differentiated market for public services, in 
which fi rms seek a set of public services, inputs into their production 
process, at the lowest possible tax price. Each competing government 
offers a supply of such services at a tax price. The market is thus struc-
tured as a straightforward competition between site and service-offering 
governments and site-searching fi rms. Since there are many demanders 
and suppliers on both sides of the market, the resulting allocation of 
fi rm investments will optimize the use of scarce public sector resources 
and maximize overall local welfare, as fi rms with different public ser-
vice needs will be drawn to the specifi c communities that offer these at 
the lowest cost.
This model is an analog of the famous Tiebout (1956b) argument in 
favor of fragmented local governments. In Tiebout’s model, households 
searched across metropolitan local governments for the utility-maxi-
mizing mix of public services (schools, public safety, and so on) at the 
lowest tax price. The Tiebout argument has been used as a post facto ra-
tionale for the effi ciency of competing local governments in U.S. met-
ropolitan areas, a form of state-level devolution that dates back to the 
late nineteenth century. Although it has been hotly contested, especially 
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on equity grounds (Markusen 1974), the theory has proven to be as ro-
bust as the proliferation of local jurisdictions. In the United States, the 
National Governors’ Association, although it has many times debated 
the issue, has repeatedly rejected any attempts to curtail subsidy com-
petition (Kayne and Shonka 1994). Similarly, in Europe, Tiebout-type 
arguments that tax competition can be welfare-improving have been 
used to oppose tax harmonization among EU states (Varsano, Ferriera, 
and Afonso 2002).
The Tiebout-like approach has several virtues. One is its acknowl-
edgement of the linkage between taxes and services received by fi rms. 
In various other approaches, and in practice, this link is broken, and 
the notion that fi rms’ taxes pay for services rendered disappears. The 
procompetition approach is also appealing because it offers a way of 
disciplining public offi cials whose behavior may otherwise not be in the 
interests of taxpayers.
On the other hand, this approach is highly simplistic. It assumes that 
the market for public services is transparent and that all parties have 
access to full information. It ignores the fact that, in reality, bargaining 
takes place as a time-constrained drama between a single fi rm and (or 
so communities believe) multiple bidding jurisdictions. It cannot easily 
cope with the fact that from a community’s point of view, fi rms aren’t 
just public service consumers and taxpayers, but are also suppliers of 
jobs. Finally, it operates from a single, selective optimality criterion—
effi ciency. Many citizens and practitioners of economic development 
care as much about equity, and in some cases, environmental impacts, 
as they do about effi cient resource allocation. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Approaches
The second position, the “suppress it” view, argues that subsidy 
competition is ineffi cient because it wastes resources by luring fi rms 
away from sites they would otherwise favor. In addition, some econo-
mists also argue that as a result of shortfalls in revenue associated with 
tax giveaways, public goods such as education, parks, and public infra-
structure will be undersupplied (Burstein and Rolnick 1995; Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski 1986). Burstein and Rolnick make both these argu-
ments in their call for Congress to tax away state and local business-
specifi c tax and subsidies. Others reason that the mix of public services 
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will be skewed by incentive competition to favor business interests at 
residents’ expense—too many business centers and airports but not 
enough parks or libraries (Keen and Marchand 1997). 
Economists making these arguments conclude that incentive com-
petition is at best a zero-sum proposition, because little or no net new 
investment is created across regions, but more likely to be negative, 
because of public goods under-provision. Following such competition 
to its logical end, one economist notes, could mean that if every govern-
ment copies the bids of every other government, the fi rm will end up 
where it would have gone anyway, no net new investment will be cre-
ated, and all governments will have reduced taxes so that public spend-
ing is suboptimal (Graham, 2003, pp. 69–71). 
That is a general equilibrium approach, but theorists working on 
this problem often conceptualize it as a “prisoner’s dilemma,” a single 
event, or game, in which a government (a prisoner) is bidding against 
other governments (other prisoners) for a single plant or facility. They 
would all be better off if they offered nothing, or the same package, the 
logic goes, but since they do not know each others’ bids, a “race to the 
bottom” is likely (Oates 1972). 
The use of the prisoner’s dilemma game to characterize spatial com-
petition for capital has a long history (Thomas 2000). Cooper (1972) 
fi rst used it to characterize subsidy competition between countries, 
followed by Guisinger (1985). Quite sophisticated formulations have 
recently been offered, including Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny’s (1998) 
modeling of state governments’ optimal response to a fi rm’s threat to 
relocate, taking into account both asymmetrical information and the 
fact that other fi rms in the state may, if the relocation buy-off succeeds, 
demand similar tax and subsidy relief. 
The prisoner’s dilemma model and its predicted outcomes are useful 
in demonstrating that fi rms can extract rents in return for their decision 
to locate new facilities or even to retain current employment. Indeed, 
the increasing exploitation of such rents may itself have exacerbated the 
mobility of capital, lowering the cost of relocation for fi rms. It is also 
useful in highlighting the information asymmetry that encumbers most 
bargaining, and it raises the interesting question why governments do 
not collude by sharing intelligence on bids to avoid rent extraction. It 
underscores the plausibility of overall welfare loss from incentive com-
petition. It also captures how many governments perceive the situation, 
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although such perceptions may themselves be a product of the popular-
ization of the model by journalists and site consultants. 
But there are problems with the prisoner’s dilemma framework. It 
is a highly stylized, simplistic formulation. It is an event-based model, 
which makes it diffi cult to evaluate strings of repeat games, especially 
since the cast of characters may change (Wood 2003). Rachel Weber, 
in Chapter 6, makes the point that certain jurisdictions may accumulate 
skill through repeat games that improve their prospects and bargaining 
power. (Firms that employ site consultants pay them to accumulate such 
skills on their behalf.) Repeat games may also help competing govern-
ments learn the virtues of collaborating, as game theory predicts more 
generally (Dixit and Skeath 2004, Chapter 11) and as demonstrated in 
the European and Australian cases we discuss above. A central theme of 
Thomas’s (2000) seminal book, Competing for Capital, is that iteration 
makes it possible for governments to cooperate to regulate investment 
competition, Ironically, some national governments (e.g., Australia) 
have recently adopted competition policies that consider such collabo-
ration potentially “anticompetitive.”
The prisoner’s dilemma model cannot easily encompass institution-
al changes in interests, power, and actors, including the rise and behav-
ior of site consultants. It does not permit information asymmetries to be 
constructed. In its more simplistic formulations, it allows bidders only 
to give or not give fi rm-specifi c subsidies. Yet, the model’s assump-
tions can be modifi ed to permit such intermediate positions (Buchholtz 
1998; Thomas 2000). Harder to build into this model are the other paths 
governments might follow to attract fi rms: lowering the overall tax rate, 
improving infrastructure, investing in schools or research and develop-
ment, worker retraining, and provision of amenities. 
Some versions of the prisoner’s dilemma model predict that win-
ning governments will actually be worse off (e.g., Graham 2003). But 
others show analytically that use of a prisoner’s dilemma model does 
not necessarily produce a “winner’s curse” (Thomas 2000, Appendix). 
Bartik, in Chapter 5, argues that the jobs and tax base created can more 
than cover the costs of incentives if offers are carefully crafted. He also 
argues that losing bidders may be better off not being saddled with ex-
cess debt and shrinking tax revenues. When modelers begin relaxing 
assumptions, the welfare losses and gains from incentive competition 
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become less clear, with some winning and some losing (Varsano, Fer-
riera, and Afonso 2002). 
The remedy indicated by the simplistic application of this model—
taxing away subsidies and tax breaks nationally—is a relatively conser-
vative notion. It is driven by a focus on interregional effi ciency rather 
than the welfare of individual regions. As Bartik notes, some economists 
making this argument (Burstein and Rolnick 1995) have no complaint 
with across-the-board tax reductions for all business, even though these 
could be highly ineffi cient from the point of view of the public sector 
and would create particularly diffi cult circumstances for economically 
distressed local areas.
Finally, the prisoner’s dilemma model has diffi culty comprehending 
the complexity of the market for investment. In actuality, government 
decision makers have multiple constituencies with competing claims, 
and their motivations are more complex than the model suggests. An in-
genious corrective for this defi cit is offered by Basinger and Hallerberg 
(2004), two political scientists who note that the empirical evidence for 
the race to the bottom is actually quite weak. They argue that political 
institutions and organizations mitigate the predicted downward spiral. 
Modifying the prisoner’s dilemma model by allowing domestic politics 
to modify governments’ behavior, they argue that governments may be 
resistant to requests for tax breaks. For instance, ruling parties may have 
strong commitments to social programs or be ideologically opposed to 
tax cuts. Both Thomas and LeRoy in this volume make the case that 
mobilized citizens can make a difference in politicians’ willingness to 
engage in incentive competition or in the type of deals struck. 
The Market for Jobs and Tax Capacity Approach
A less elegant but more complex view is that regional governments 
are preoccupied with creating jobs and amplifying tax capacity. While 
the two approaches reviewed above are rooted in public fi nance and 
microeconomics, this view is more attentive to institutional structure 
and behavior and common among economists, geographers, planners, 
and other researchers working on economic development. The market 
in which governments face fi rms seeking sites can thus be considered a 
market for jobs and tax base, rather than for public services or for capital 
investments. State and local governments offer incentives in return for 
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promised jobs, revealed in both the rhetoric accompanying announce-
ments of sitings and in efforts to hold fi rms to their job-creating com-
mitments with clawback provisions or penalties for nonperformance, 
though the latter are often weak. In a similar analysis of the “market for 
economic development,” Weber (2002a) uses an institutionalist trans-
actions cost framework to conceptualize this process. 
Jobs thus generated are socially valuable, in that they lower local 
unemployment, raise local labor force participation, enable skill ac-
quisition, and have progressive effects on the local income distribu-
tion (Bartik 2001, 2004; Courant 1994). The jobs created also generate 
higher incomes for residents, who in turn spend the additional income 
on local goods and services that generate yet other jobs and are invested 
in housing that generates real estate taxes. Jobs and expanded tax capac-
ity are valued by residents, by politicians for their announcement value, 
as we argued above, and by the local growth machine as well. Compet-
ing governments can be characterized as competing for jobs and tax 
base, and fi rms looking for sites as supplying them. The fi rms pursue 
incentives as a rent-seeking activity (Weber 2002a; Wolkoff 1992). In 
what follows, we focus on job creation and less on tax capacity, because 
it applies more generically to international as well as domestic cases, 
and because the institutional setting for incentive competition at the 
submetropolitan level is more particularistic, involving the retail sector 
and the growing role of planners and local government offi cials in real 
estate development (Weber 2002b). 
Evidence for the pivotal role of jobs in such bargains comes from 
a remarkable study by Gabe and Kraybill (2002), who argue that fi rms 
have an incentive to overannounce the numbers of jobs they will create 
to increase the size of incentives offered. In a study of 366 Ohio estab-
lishments’ expansions between 1993 and 1995, they found that those 
that received incentives overannounced employment targets but created 
no new jobs (and actually led to a reduction in the overall number of 
jobs), while those that did not receive incentives accurately forecast 
their job expansion and did create new jobs. Gabe and Kraybill, citing 
Krueger (1974), suggest that the puzzling job decline in establishments 
winning incentives might be explained by fi rm reallocation of resources 
away from internal effi ciencies in production and toward rent-seeking. 
We view incentive competition as taking place in a spatial “market 
for jobs” that is an institutional innovation of site consultants who work 
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to maintain information asymmetries that permit rent-taking. As Weber 
argues in Chapter 6 of this book and elsewhere (2002a), the power bal-
ance in the market for jobs is uneven, in part because local governments 
“are embedded in space and not footloose like businesses.” She notes 
that businesses are better able to control the fl ow of information during 
incentive negotiations and that the size of the incentive package they 
need “to make a project feasible may be much smaller than what they 
would have the public sector believe.” Local governments are not privy 
to actual cost structures and hurdle rates. 
Institutional economists have long understood the importance of 
opportunistic behavior and the role of information asymmetries in fa-
cilitating it (Williamson 1975). Close observers of incentive competi-
tion note that government offi cials rarely possess accurate information 
regarding an investor’s true intentions (Bachelor 1997; Thomas 2007; 
Weber 2007). Reid and Gatrell (2003, pp. 112–113) argue that compa-
nies that least need incentives have the resources to most effectively 
engage in opportunistic behavior. They cite documented cases where, 
after large incentives packages had been granted on the presumption of 
competition, corporate executives admitted that other sites were never 
seriously considered. 
LeRoy (2005) details how site consultants encourage candidate 
communities to think of themselves as in competition with other com-
munities, sometimes creating high-profi le bidding, as in the Chicago/
Denver/Dallas competition for Boeing’s relocating headquarters, but 
often not revealing the identity of competitors. Governments are coun-
seled to keep their bids top secret, the implied sanction being perma-
nent black-balling by the site brokering consultants. Thus, collusion 
among localities is suppressed, while the site consulting brokerages can 
be seen as practicing a sort of informal collusion on behalf of fi rms to 
maximize the rents that can be extracted. This is why site-seeking fi rms 
themselves do not invest in site selection but purchase such services 
from a supplier sector.
The way that the site consultant sector organizes and mediates incen-
tive competition reveals the extent to which information asymmetries 
are created and maintained as a condition of rent extraction. Gabe and 
Kraybill (2002, p. 707) document how the state of Ohio interacts with 
the site selection industry. Every year, the state submits to Site Selection 
magazine its list of fi rm attractions or expansions in the state with an-
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nounced creation of 50 or more jobs. The magazine then uses this data 
to compare business growth in states across the nation. By creating this 
competition and a data base that solicits state announced job expan-
sions, the site selection industry has created an incentive for states to 
list (and thus to subsidize) as many projects as possible to improve the 
state’s ranking relative to other states. Site consultants, especially when 
acting as dual agents, can horde information that they have on fi rms’ in-
tentions and on the larger fi eld of competition, including the willingness 
and ability of other communities and states to offer incentives. 
The “market for jobs” approach generally accepts the necessity for 
governments to compete for capital and to use tools at hand in pursuit 
of jobs and community well-being. The policy implications, then, focus 
on how to curtail rent-taking, improve transparency in location deci-
sions, understand why some tools are better than others, and help gov-
ernments understand the complicated current and long-term trade-offs 
associated with developing an incentive offer. 
Among the virtues of the market for jobs approach is this focus on 
institutional factors—on the messy, complicated way that subsidy com-
petition unfolds in reality and how an expanded set of actors (including 
politicians, growth machines, and site consultants) behave under such 
circumstances. It acknowledges the centrality of the desire for jobs as 
a motivation for competing governments. Yet in doing so, it has the 
disadvantage of obscuring the role of taxes as a price for public ser-
vices and neglects the negative long-term consequences of associated 
tax erosion. 
Most of the authors in this book work from a market for jobs and 
tax capacity point of view, although Bartik’s strong defense of state 
and local governments’ legitimate economic development role and 
rejection of higher level prohibitions shares elements of the Tiebout-
based approach. Thomas, using a prisoner’s dilemma approach, con-
cludes that subsidy competition has effi ciency, equity, and environmen-
tal drawbacks and should be regulated, but does not believe subsidies 
are always bad policy. Fisher’s chapter summarizes the evidence on 
long-term corporate tax erosion and is in that sense compatible with the 
prisoner’s dilemma implications. All three call for reforms and make 
specifi c detailed recommendations for reform. 
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Normative Issues
In evaluating the power and usefulness of those three approaches, 
it is useful to acknowledge differences in underlying normative pos-
ture. In general, economists using Tiebout-type or prisoner’s dilemma 
models work from an explicit assumption that economic effi ciency is 
the sole concern of economic analysis and rationale for policy interven-
tion. However, in economic development practice, a strong case is often 
made by economists and planners for equity and environmental quality 
norms co-equal with effi ciency (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002). Much of 
economic development practice is framed by an overarching concern 
for jobs, and not just any jobs, but quality jobs and jobs for the hardest 
to employ. Bartik, in Chapter 5, states that more local employment is a 
social good and points out that if all local governments competed in a 
smart way, it is not obvious that their optimal economic development 
subsidies would impose a net effi ciency cost on other jurisdictions. 
In this volume, distributional concerns receive careful attention. 
Bartik, Schweke, Weber, and LeRoy all address the creation of quality 
jobs. Bartik (1993) evaluates incentives for their ability to produce jobs 
for existing residents rather than newcomers and fi nds that in the long 
run, about 80 percent of new jobs in local economies are refl ected in 
more population rather than higher employment rates. However, Bartik 
(1991) also fi nds that spurts of local growth benefi t locals at the back 
of the labor queue and less-skilled and African American workers es-
pecially. Schweke specifi cally addresses the targeting of incentives to 
those regions and individuals most in need of work.
Others—Thomas, for instance—are sensitive to the regressive 
distributional impact of subsidies that favor owners of capital at the 
expense of residents of the community and worsen the income distri-
bution. Fisher, in Chapter 3, gives hard estimates for the degree of re-
gressivity that has accompanied the erosion of state and local business 
taxes overall. Thomas addresses harmful environmental consequences, 
as when subsidies induce building in a fl oodplain or when negative ex-
ternalities are imposed on neighboring communities. 
In his chapter, Fisher cautions against attributing all observed neg-
ative fi scal trends in recent years to incentive competition. He offers 
three other plausible hypotheses. For one, conservative ideological op-
position to the size of the public sector per se may be contributing. For 
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those who believe government is too large, the strategy is to “starve the 
beast,” fi rst by cutting taxes and then by claiming fi scal responsibil-
ity and the necessity to cut services. For another, there is the durable 
though minority “supply side” theory that contends that growth is only 
possible by lightening the tax burden on business. Third, some conser-
vatives forthrightly attack progressive income taxes, a form of class 
warfare rationalized by the tenuous idea that cutting capital gains taxes 
for individuals will stimulate new business activity in the same state. 
These are important normative and ideological contributors to confl ict 
over subnational taxation. In legislatures and city councils where the 
Republican party has dominated (including the national Congress for 
the last decade), business tax base erosion and tax regressivity have 
been on the rise.
Inequities are also possible between fi rms and among regions. Sub-
sidies to particular fi rms can also be inequitable between owners of 
capital and their employed workers, when some fi rms are unfairly sub-
sidized at the expense of their competitors, an argument recently made 
in important U.S. court cases and pressed by nonrecipient fi rms in their 
bid for similar concessions. Indeed, important cases are currently work-
ing their way through the courts using the Interstate Commerce Clause 
that prohibits restraints on trade as a rationale for striking down incen-
tive packages targeted at interstate fi rm moves.
In general, too, richer states and localities walk away with the priz-
es, as Varsano, Ferriera, and Afonso (2002) fi nd in Brazil; Schneider 
(2004) in India; and Luger and Bae (2005) in North Carolina. In Chap-
ter 6, Weber describes how this happens at the local level in the United 
States: the more assets a place possesses, the more leverage, expertise, 
and decisional independence it will have and the better negotiating po-
sition it will establish. In contrast, poorer jurisdictions will have to offer 
more to succeed and are much more likely to give away the store to lure 
a plant, often without demanding performance. 
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DOES INCENTIVE COMPETITION YIELD ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT FOR WINNERS?
A paradox in debate over incentive competition is that there is little 
agreement about whether engaging in it results in benefi ts for bid-win-
ning states and localities. The evidence, most of it on the U.S. case, is 
mixed. For an initial assessment of the international case, see Guisinger 
(1986). 
Some researchers argue that incentives are too small to matter to 
fi rms in their choice of location. Their evidence is based on surveys 
in which fi rms respond to questions about which spatially differenti-
ated factors of product matter most to them in siting plant and facili-
ties (Guisinger 1992; Enrich 1996; Farrell, Remes, and Schulz 2003). 
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) fi nd that cities winning high-profi le 
plants in the United States did better than their losing competitors, but 
as Fisher argues in Chapter 3, the researchers assumed that the incen-
tives were decisive rather than bargained for after the fact. 
Up through the late 1980s, the consensus was that economic de-
velopment incentives had at best an ambiguous impact on growth and 
probably little to no impact at all (Eisinger 1988; Peters and Fisher 
2002). Since then, a number of empirical studies have shown that tax 
incentives and other subsidies do make a difference in regional growth 
rates (Bartik 2007; Hines 1995; Newman and Sullivan 1988; Phillips 
and Goss 1995; Wasylenko 1997). The evidence appears stronger for 
job creation than net positive tax effects (Peters and Fisher 2002). Bar-
tik (1994) argues that it is highly likely that incentives are always rev-
enue negative. The causality is so complex, however, that at least one 
researcher, reviewing the U.S. case, has concluded that no one really 
knows what the effectiveness or welfare implications of incentive com-
petition are (Graham 2003, p. 71). 
Even if governments that engage in successful incentive offers sub-
sequently generate more output, jobs, and tax revenues, it does not nec-
essarily constitute economic development. For one thing, it may not be 
positive for the state or country as a whole, if other jurisdictions lose 
jobs and tax base as a result. And there are the distributional conse-
quences as well, where tax burdens are shifted to residents and the qual-
ity of public services declines. Fisher’s chapter shows the long-term 
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erosion in business tax shares of state revenues, from a high of nearly 
10 percent in 1980 to just under 5 percent by 2002. Peters and Fisher 
(2002), in a study of state enterprise zones, show that during just eight 
years in the 1990s, the effective state tax rate on new investment fell by 
30 percent. LeRoy’s (2005) book cites many cases of local governments 
unable to pay for operating expenses and other services following risky 
underwriting of competed projects, including long-term responsibility 
for paying off bonds used to build infrastructure that is subsequently 
unused. Citizens of these jurisdictions are thus now shouldering a high-
er share of the tax burden for public services (without any clear increase 
in the share devoted to them) and are going without services they might 
otherwise have enjoyed. 
Furthermore, even for bid-winning localities whose jobs and tax 
base expand, economic development outcomes might have been more 
positive had those resources been used differently. Each subsidy and tax 
expenditure involves opportunity costs for governments and their citi-
zens. Even better jobs and greater tax capacity might have resulted from 
alternative allocations of economic development resources. To this fi nal 
question we now turn.
IS ATTRACTION OF EXTERNAL EXPORT-PRODUCING 
PHYSICAL CAPITAL THE ONLY ROUTE TO JOBS?
So far, we have not tied incentive competition to an important, hal-
lowed theory in economic development—that a region’s overall growth 
is tied to its ability to export to other regions goods and services that in 
return permit it to import the goods and services that it cannot competi-
tively produce. The prominence of export base theory as a conception 
of macro growth at the subnational level has not been seriously ques-
tioned in the half century since it was formulated, though at the national 
level, some national governments have engaged in an alternative import 
substitution strategy, an approach much discredited in recent years. In 
our view, incentive competition is embraced by state and local govern-
ments because leaders believe that only export-oriented activity will 
generate net new jobs. (Intrametropolitan bidding wars for retail jobs 
simply decides who gets the jobs without altering the total created.) 
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In this section we review the history of export base theory, sometimes 
called economic base theory, and evaluate the evidence on its power to 
explain aggregate regional growth. 
Historically, the world economy has experienced large swings in 
openness, followed by signifi cant slowdowns and retrenchments. Eco-
nomic integration is not a unilateral progression over time, nor are ex-
ports reliably the leading source of regional economic growth. In the 
fi rst half of the nineteenth century, economist Douglass North (1966) 
elegantly demonstrated that slave-cultivated southern cotton drove the 
aggregate U.S. capital accumulation and the growth rate. After the Civil 
War, the United States retreated behind high tariff barriers to nurture its 
own manufacturing economy, growing robustly from an internal elabo-
ration of the division of labor, especially the synergy between increas-
ingly capital-intensive agriculture and producer goods manufacturing 
(Hobsbawm 1975). Thus, in successive eras, regional and national 
economic growth has been variously oriented externally or internally. 
Shifts from one to the other are linked to developments in technology, 
especially in transportation and communications, but also to political 
and institutional changes. 
We currently live in an era that is preoccupied with trade. Most 
economists argue that regions must specialize and export more than 
ever before, because the penetration of inexpensive and often high-
quality imports is eroding whole segments of local and regional econo-
mies (Howes and Markusen 1993). Ever since North’s (1955) elegant 
statement of it, indebted to Innis’s (1930) staples theory, the export base 
argument goes more or less as follows. In a trade-integrated world, re-
gions outside of one’s own are superior producers of many goods and 
services locally consumed, and in order to be able to pay for these im-
ports, the region must specialize in certain exportable goods and ser-
vices. In the mid-twentieth century world, with its sophisticated globe-
transcending transportation systems that reached far into little hamlets 
everywhere, the power of this theory was manifest. Economists codi-
fi ed the theory into the economic base model, ubiquitously used even 
today in multiplier analysis.
Nevertheless, from the beginning, the theory had its critics. In his 
famous debate with North, Tiebout (1956a) pointed out an obvious logi-
cal fl aw in the theory: the world economy as a whole does not export. In 
addition, a regional economy’s ability to provide for itself increases as 
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its income from exports grows, resulting in import substitution. Tiebout 
also argued that people have different consumption patterns in different 
regions, complicating the model’s application. But more importantly, 
Tiebout argued for an endogenous theory. Harkening back to Adam 
Smith, he posited that an elaborating internal division of labor could 
spur regional growth without export growth. His theory was brilliantly 
applied by Lindstrom (1978) in her renowned book on the early Phil-
adelphia region, where she showed that a relatively autarchic region 
grew robustly from growing synergies between diversifi ed farming and 
more urban manufacturing industries. Bartik (2004) makes the modern 
case for non-export-oriented sources of job and tax base growth by not-
ing that cases where a new local-serving activity absorbs underutilized 
land or labor, or where it increases overall productivity.
Subsequently, practitioners of economic development vigorously 
debated and experimented with import substitution and export-based 
strategies for regional and national development, especially in the de-
veloping world. Many industrialized countries, among them the United 
States and Japan, nurtured their early industrial economies behind large 
tariff barriers and succeeded in import substitution on a massive scale. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Latin American countries in particular tried to 
follow this path, but the strategy’s apparent failure brought an emphasis 
on export base strategies back into fashion. 
Yet the evidence on the relationship between overall growth and 
export growth is far from established. In recent decades, economists 
working in international development have begun to question the lead 
role of exports in explaining GDP growth for both developing and de-
veloped countries. As early as the 1960s, Ball (1962) argued that export 
expansion could retard domestic development by siphoning off invest-
ment. Others have argued that exports may be a consequence rather 
than a cause of economic growth. In a number of carefully constructed 
empirical tests, scholars fi nd mixed evidence on both the existence of 
a relationship and the direction of causality. Jung and Marshall (1985) 
found that for 37 developing countries, evidence on the period 1950–
1981 supports the export promotion thesis in only four cases; fi ve coun-
tries reduced exports with growth, while four countries experienced 
export growth with output reduction. Ghartey (1993) concluded that 
export-driven development appears to explain growth in Taiwan but 
not Japan or the United States. In a fi ve-country study, Sharma, Norris, 
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and Wai-Wah-Cheung (1991) found that Japan and Germany experi-
enced export-led growth from 1960 to 1987 but in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, output growth appears to have induced export 
growth. 
Thus, at the national level there is no clear evidence that exports 
drive overall growth. There is equally strong evidence that endogenous 
developments—new product creation fi rst aimed at local markets and 
process innovations that increase productivity—may drive growth and 
prompt export expansion. What about regional growth? Why might lo-
cally oriented economic activity drive overall regional growth in an 
increasingly competitive world? 
Several hypotheses have been advanced. For one, an innovation 
aimed at a local market might turn out to have much broader appli-
cability and become an exported product or service (Cortright 2002). 
Boeing’s original seaplanes, designed for Seattle use, are an example. 
For another, people are also mobile and may choose locations to live 
and work based on amenities, creating more local-serving activities 
paid for with asset income or entitlements (like Social Security) earned 
elsewhere (Nelson and Beyers 1998). Many midsized American met-
ropolitan areas have grown principally from retiree in-migration, and 
many larger cities have grown through immigration not tied to spe-
cifi c jobs. Third, secular changes in consumption patterns, linked to 
demographic characteristics such as aging or labor force participation 
decisions such as two-parent households, may result in disproportion-
ate demand for local-serving industries. Markusen and Schrock (2006) 
fi nd that over the period 1980–2000, the local-serving occupations in 
the 30 largest U.S. metros outpaced job growth in export base occupa-
tions by four to one. For a more general treatment of the potential for 
local-serving economic development strategies to produce growth, see 
Markusen (2007). 
The evidence is thus not compelling that exogenous growth, linked 
to export demand and the attraction of mobile capital, is more powerful 
than endogenous growth from human capital investments, innovation, 
an elaborating local division of labor, amenities-led population growth, 
or consumption shifts. Exports do matter, but they are not everything. 
If this is the case, decisions about fi rm subsidies should be embedded 
in a portfolio approach to economic development, in which the short- 
and long-term opportunity costs of particular incentives are weighed 
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against alternative investments that might be superior from a normative 
point of view for the community involved. LeRoy’s chapter includes 
a call for unifi ed development budgets as one way to implement just 
such a portfolio approach. Schweke, St. George, and Rist (1998) did the 
original conceptual work on unifi ed development budgets. To date, the 
best application of the concept is the study published by Mountain As-
sociation for Community Economic Development (2005) for the state 
of Kentucky. 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS
With the authors in this volume, we conclude that state and local 
governments should, and in many countries do, have the responsibil-
ity for shepherding economic development in their communities. As 
Weber states, taxes and expenditures are among the few tools they 
have to pursue good jobs and long term stability for their constituents, 
along with certain regulatory strategies. The policy challenge is not to 
embrace incentive competition or fully suppress it, but to reform it in 
ways that encourage the benefi ts to exceed the costs and to achieve nor-
mative goals on effi ciency, equity, and environmental fronts. Even the 
European Union, as Sinnaeve articulates, distinguishes between good 
subsidies and bad. 
The chapters in this book are rich in policy recommendations aimed 
at local, state, and national governments, based on careful reasoning 
and empirical evidence. Political scientist Thomas makes the case for 
the excesses of contemporary subsidy competition and tells a sordid 
tale of information asymmetry and political machinations at the local 
level in a particular subsidy case. Although he favors eliminating in-
centive competition with a European Union–type regulatory system, he 
believes this is unrealistic for the United States. Sinnaeve acknowledg-
es the downside of the EU system—it requires a heavy administrative 
burden, struggles with the right balance between rule-making and fl ex-
ibility, and does not fully suppress illegal aid. Other nations, however, 
might be well-advised to adopt an EU-type regulatory regime because it 
has achieved impressive gains in deterring subsidy offers and eliminat-
ing distorted competition. 
up07amritcCh.1.indd   31 4/11/2008   10:30:48 AM
32   Markusen and Nesse
Bartik reviews the conditions under which incentives are reason-
able, advising the use of cost/benefi t analysis for governments engaging 
in negotiations and competitions. He cautions against looking only at 
jobs and tax revenues and suggests including the costs and benefi ts of 
public services and the prospects for local versus nonlocal hiring. 
Schweke critiques an existing incentive program in North Carolina, 
the William S. Lee Act, that was designed to favor poorer counties but 
has not, and proposes two targeted state tax incentive programs in its 
place. One would kick in during cyclical downturns, creating jobs by 
giving fi rms tax credits for wages of newly hired workers, spurring a 
substitution of labor for capital. The other would target the highest un-
employment counties in the state by giving employers wage and bene-
fi ts subsidies to hire unemployed, local workers. These programs would 
induce job creation in regions and among workers who most need work, 
in contrast to the Lee Act, which has subsidized mainly large fi rms to 
locate in wealthy suburban areas around the largest cities, bringing 
many of their workers with them. Schweke’s proposals demonstrate the 
careful tailoring that must be undertaken to ensure that the reforms, 
rather than prohibitions, will be able to address the ineffi ciencies and 
inequities of incentive competition. 
Bartik, Weber, and LeRoy offer detailed reforms to improve the op-
eration of the jobs market. These include transparency, performance 
requirements, community benefi ts agreements, pay-as-you-go deals, 
school board say on TIF and tax abatements (to prevent erosion of pub-
lic funds for schools), unifi ed development budgets, and multijurisdic-
tional tax regime reforms, such as closing corporate reporting loopholes 
and repealing the single sales factor formulation at the state level. We-
ber focuses her recommendations on local public offi cials and how they 
might improve their bargaining position in deal-making. LeRoy, appre-
ciating the virtues of simple and straightforward remedies, offers fewer, 
simpler laws and stronger enforcement. His set of nine reforms includes 
three innovative ideas: disclosure of state-by-state taxes paid to corpo-
rate shareholders (which would raise the visibility of exploitation of 
differentials in state tax systems), using federal spending as a carrot 
(and a stick) against job piracy; and defi ning site location consultants as 
lobbyists and regulating them accordingly. 
Although many state and local government and interest group lead-
ers have been seeking incentive competition reform in the United States 
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and elsewhere for some time, there has been a quickening of interest 
and a coalescing of ideas and organizational energy in the last decade. 
As the excesses worsen and governments feel greater pressure to spend 
time and resources in business recruitment, many observers think that 
the time is ripe for signifi cant reform along the lines of the propos-
als offered in this book. A great deal of credit goes to LeRoy and his 
organization, Good Jobs First, which has served as an important clear-
inghouse for information on subsidy competition and applied research 
shop for evaluating outcomes of past deals. 
As the market for jobs goes global and devolution deepens, the site 
consulting industry is entering new territory, especially in developing 
countries. A great challenge for economists, economic development 
practitioners, and activists working on these issues is to cope with this 
internationalization of subsidy competition. State and local govern-
ments in more developed nations may fi nd themselves pitted not so 
much against each other but against competitors yet farther afi eld with 
whom it is even more diffi cult to communicate and compare notes. Eco-
nomic development offi cials, politicians, and the public in developing 
countries where incentive competition is spreading need ideas, help and 
cooperation from experts and organizations that are already success-
fully regulating such competition, as in the European Union, or who are 
slowly winning battles in transparency requirements, deal negotiations, 
court cases, and broader views of economic development strategy and 
tools. We hope that this volume contributes substantially to this effort. 
Notes
 1.  Rachel Weber, personal communication with the author, 2006.
 2. Timothy J. Bartik, personal communication with the author, 2006.
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